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It is an exciting time to be a telecommunications lawyer. I
suspect that many said the same thing over the sixty-two years
between the Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 (the "Telecom Act" or the "Act"), but re-
cent changes in technology and the attendant legal and regula-
tory challenges of implementing the new Act are attracting
considerable attention and legal talent to our field. The cur-
rent shift in the regime for regulating telecommunications be-
gan in the 1970s with the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's ("FCC's") pro-competitive agenda and the Department of
Justice's suit against AT&T.' These actions facilitated entry
into previously closed-off markets, such as equipment manufac-
turing and long distance service, laying the foundation for the
ambitious efforts called for by the Telecom Act. Today, we can
look back at these efforts and see the inevitability of competi-
tion in telecommunications. Not too long ago, however, the
FCC and many observers of telecommunications policy
shunned the very thought of competition.2 For that reason, we
must be particularly grateful for the brave actions of those who
helped to blaze the trail of competition in telecommunications,
like Judge Harold Greene, who just recently passed away.'
* Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colo-
rado; J.D. 1994, New York University School of Law; B.A. 1990, Swarthmore Col-
lege. Thanks to Ellen Goodman, Jon Nuechterlein, Marius Schwartz, and Kathy
Wallman for helpful comments and encouragement.
1. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), af/d sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also Applications of
Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (1956) (re-
versing FCC order preventing the use of the "Hush-A-Phone" product that would
compete with Bell system customer premises equipment).
3. See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Harold Greene, Judge Who Oversaw The
Breakup of AT&T, Is Dead at 76, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at A24 (quoting
Greene as saying that AT&T consent decree "brought competition into a field
where there hadn't been any competition").
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This Symposium brings together some of the nation's finest
minds in the telecommunications field to reflect upon where we
are in the journey to competition in all telecommunications
markets. In enacting the Telecom Act, Congress opened a door
that cannot be closed, committing our nation to a course that
technological change would have eventually made inevitable: a
future of competition and an end to artificial distinctions cre-
ated by regulation. Managing the transition to competitive
markets will continue to keep lawyers, economists, academics,
and lobbyists busy for some time. Therefore, I hope our efforts
here manage to add some value to this undertaking. In the ar-
eas of realigning our nation's jurisdictional framework for
regulating telephony and for promoting universal service goals;
pursuing open access policies in the name of competition; "re-
missioning" regulatory agencies long focused on command-and-
control regulation; and coming to grips with the internet, any
creative insights will be particularly valuable to those in
Washington and elsewhere who are struggling to navigate the
right course in these areas. To provide an overview of these
important areas, and of what will be discussed in the papers
presented at this Symposium, this essay outlines some of my
thoughts on these topics.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF A COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
Long before the Telecom Act, many observers recognized
that a dual federalism model of telecommunications regulation
could not persist as competition increasingly broke down the
artificial boundaries between local and long distance calls. The
old jurisdictional scheme, constructed around section 2(b) of the
Communications Act,4 mandated a separation between federal
and state regulation that one court described as "hog tight,
horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding
on the states' intrastate turf."5  But as the Supreme Court
properly recognized in the Iowa Utilities Board litigation,' the
Telecom Act moved away from a dual federalism model-under
4. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994).
5. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
6. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 378-84.
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which the federal jurisdiction enjoyed only limited authority as
to intrastate service-to a cooperative federalism one, where
state agencies exercise federal authority as to the regulation of
the local telephone network.
The transition to a new jurisdictional framework for tele-
communications regulation, as discussed in Bob Rowe's article,7
raises a series of difficult legal and regulatory questions, in-
cluding how to reform the use of implicit subsidies to support
universal service goals. Some commentators, like Professors
James Alleman, Paul N. Rappoport, and Dennis Weller, argue
that universal service policy is fundamentally misguided.' Un-
til the Act is amended, however, the FCC and the state agen-
cies are stuck with this formidable challenge.' After first dis-
cussing the change in the jurisdictional paradigm of
telecommunications regulation, I then will reflect on some of
the challenges posed by universal service reform.
A. Cooperative Federalism
The legal architecture of the Telecom Act follows the coop-
erative federalist model that Congress employed in prior regu-
latory regimes such as the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act ("PURPA")1 ° and the Pole Attachment Act of 1978.11
PURPA, in setting a national policy to encourage the use of al-
ternate energy sources, relied quite heavily on state agencies,
allowing them considerable flexibility to implement its man-
dates. 2 In the Pole Attachment Act, Congress declined to in-
7. See Bob Rowe, Substance Plus Process-Telecoms Regulations Reforms to
Protect Consumers and Promote Investment, 71 COLO. L. REV. 879, 890 (2000)
(noting that the Act sets out a number of cooperative federalist innovations to be
implemented, including interconnection, consumer protection, universal service,
Bell Operating Company provision of long distance service, and promotion of ac-
cess to advanced technology).
8. See James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty of Policy, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 849 (2000).
9. See Rowe, supra note 7, at 916 ("It is highly unlikely that, in the foresee-
able future universal service expectations will vanish, given the expansive univer-
sal service definitions in Section 254 .... ").
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (1994); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304 (1999).
11. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
12. See Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51
(1982) (explaining that PURPA sought to both overcome the reluctance of utilities
to purchase power from non-traditional providers and the burdens imposed on
such providers by state and federal regulatory authorities); Crossroads Cogenera-
tion Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc., 159 F.3d 129, 135 (3rd Cir. 1998)
2000]
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sist on a uniform approach to this issue, but instead left the
FCC with residual authority to implement the Act and offered
states the opportunity to implement the statutory standard.
13
Similarly, the Telecom Act set forth a series of federal statutory
mandates to provide access rights to the existing telephone
network for new entrants, and offered the states the opportu-
nity to implement this new regime in a manner consistent with
federal law and FCC regulations.14
Because the Telecom Act imperfectly sets out the relation-
ship between the federal and state agencies, its enactment
spawned a great controversy over how its vision of cooperative
federalism would work. Under the Act, new entrants into the
local telephone market are entitled to interconnect with the in-
cumbent providers and lease access to elements of the incum-
bent's network on an "unbundled basis."15 The Act did not,
however, definitively resolve whether the authority to price
unbundled elements rested with the FCC or the state Public
Utilities Commissions ("PUCs"), leading each side to claim that
authority for itself.
After a three-year legal battle, the Supreme Court rejected
the states' argument that Congress intended the states to exer-
cise exclusive authority in the area of pricing unbundled ele-
ments.16 By concluding that the FCC enjoyed complete resid-
ual authority under the Act, the Court rejected the Eighth
Circuit's narrow reading that the FCC only enjoyed authority
to regulate intrastate service where it was specifically author-
ized to act.'7 In so doing, Justice Scalia set forth a coherent vi-
sion of the Act that left open a number of novel legal issues,
which arose as a result of the Act's groundbreaking cooperative
federalism approach, such as whether state agencies deserve
deference in interpreting federal law.'"
("Though PURPA does limit the authority of state agencies in some respects, e.g.,
by exempting cogeneration facilities from some regulation, PURPA still provides a
substantial role to state agencies in regulating energy contracts between utilities
and cogenerators.").
13. See 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)-(c) (1994).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (Supp. III 1997).
15. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (Supp. III 1997).
16. See AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
17. See id. 374-76.
18. See, e.g., id. at 733 n.10 (stating that the scheme put in place by Telecom
Act "is decidedly novel, and the attendant legal questions, such as whether federal
[Vol.71
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I cannot quarrel with Justice Scalia's conclusions that the
presumption in federal legislation should be that Congress
leaves all residual authority to the federal agency to interpret
federal law and that the Telecom Act lacked the unmistakable
clarity to carve out from FCC oversight the pricing standard for
unbundled elements. I do take exception, however, to Justice
Scalia's suggestion that there is something "surpassing
strange" about a world in which Congress would choose to
delegate federal authority to state agencies without FCC over-
sight.19 Admittedly, such a scheme raises challenging legal
questions, but as Justice Thomas's dissent implicitly suggests,
I believe that these questions can be answered satisfactorily.2 °
In accepting the presumption that the FCC enjoys residual
authority over all telecommunications regulation, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the FCC takes on a great responsibility
to exercise that authority carefully. The FCC should not,
therefore, assume that the mere presence of federal authority
demands the creation of uniform federal rules. As I have ex-
plained elsewhere, the notion that federal law must be uniform
continues to resonate, particularly among judges, despite the
fact that "Our Federalism" has always entrusted states with
the administration of federal law and tolerated diverse re-
sults.2 To be sure, an occasional judge will decide that state
agencies should be given deference in the implementation of
federal statutory standards where the FCC has declined to set
forth a single interpretation.22 Far more often, however, courts
will state that they will not review state agency decisions un-
der a deferential standard, but do just that in practice.23 That
courts must defer to state agency interpretations of federal law, are novel as
well.").
19. See id. at 730 n.6.
20. See id. at 741 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I
leave the answers to these questions to a forthcoming article.
21. See Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommu-
nications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1999).
22. See, e.g., US West Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 75 F.
Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Utah 1999).
23. Courts have often acknowledged that "it is neither desirable nor practi-
cal for this court to sit as a surrogate public utilities commission to second-guess
the decisions made by the state agency to which Congress has committed primary
responsibility for implementing the Act in Oregon." MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
GTE Northwest, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161 (D. Or. 1999). Yet courts almost
uniformly conclude that "whether the PUC properly interpreted and applied the
Act ... is a question of federal law that is reviewed de novo." Id. Nonetheless,
20001
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stance is unfortunate, because an important feature of a coop-
erative federalist framework is its allowance for a state labora-
tory approach to regulation.24
B. Universal Service
As difficult as it is may be to develop a coherent under-
standing of the Act's cooperative federalism legal framework, it
is even more difficult to develop an understanding of how to
advance its universal service goals. In 1996, Congress codified
the decades-old principle that telephone users should be af-
forded access to the telephone network at reasonable rates, re-
gardless of where they live.25 This ambitious vision, which
called for the subsidization of telephone users in rural and poor
areas, did not provide much guidance as to exactly how it
should be implemented.26 Rather, the Act handed the ball to
the FCC, mandating that the FCC work with a Joint Federal-
State Board-another cooperative federalism innovation of
telecommunications regulation that calls for federal and state
regulators to work together-to figure it out.
27
In developing a new scheme for universal service support
that relies on explicit, competitively neutral subsidies-as op-
posed to implicit ones that are built into the rate structure-
the FCC must confront a series of technical, economic, and
political minefields. In essence, the FCC has been saddled with
the task of designing a program similar to the Medicaid Act's
system of providing medical service to the poor, though on a
much smaller scale. Medicaid, like universal service support, in-
volves a grant-in-aid program where the federal government
sets basic standards, provides monetary support, and leaves
such courts often go ahead and defer to state agency interpretations in practice by
accepting the state agency decision where the statutory term was ambiguous and
not clearly addressed in an FCC regulation. See Weiser, supra note 21, at 44-53.
24. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). With respect to the model for handling disputes concerning inter-
connection agreements between new entrants and incumbents, for example, dif-
ferent states have experimented with alternative approaches. See Bob Rowe,
"Best Practices" in Implementation of the Telecommunications Act, in PLI Order
No. GO-0089, at 41, 44 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course Handbook Series No. 584 (1999)).
25. See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
26. See Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 423 (5th
Cir. 1999) (describing § 254's mandate as "aspirational" in nature).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
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the implementation-as well as elective supplementation-to
the states.28 Given the breadth of this challenge, one should
not be surprised to learn that the FCC has not exactly moved
with alacrity to institute a new universal service regime.29
The Fifth Circuit's review of the FCC's Universal Service
Order ° may well undermine both the FCC's ability to under-
take this ambitious effort and its ability to move to a coopera-
tive federalism framework in this area. Initially, the FCC con-
cluded that its mandate to support universal service authorized
it to collect fees from intrastate as well as interstate services.
The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that "there is substantial
support in the statute for a dual regulatory structure in the
administration of the universal service program."31 In justify-
ing this result, the Fifth Circuit noted that allowing the FCC to
assess intrastate revenues would run afoul of section 2(b)'s ju-
risdictional limitation.3 2 Unfortunately, this holding runs con-
trary to the political science perspective that national efforts,
far more than local ones, effectively can pursue distributional
policy goals such as subsidizing telephone service in remote ar-
eas.33 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's decision not only de-
parts from the cooperative federalist thrust of Iowa Utilities
Board, but it also will limit the funds available for distribution
from the federal government to the states, thus making it more
difficult for the less-well-off states to implement workable uni-
versal service programs.
II. OPEN ACCESS
On numerous occasions, FCC Commissioner Michael Pow-
ell has stated that an interesting side of technological conver-
gence is regulatory convergence. America Online ("AOL"), for
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp. III 1997).
29. See Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 408 n.8 (noting that
the FCC postponed the effective date of universal service reform from January 1,
1999, to July 1, 1999, and then to January 1, 2000).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 424.
32. See id. at 447.
33. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and The Minority
Poor: Accounting For the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 582
(1999) ("[Tlhe empirical evidence on the political economy of state decisionmaking
suggests that the state level provides a worse environment than the national
arena for deciding fundamental questions about redistribution.").
2000]
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example, must have had a few interesting internal discussions
about how to explain why AT&T should provide open access to
AT&T's cable modems, but it need not provide AT&T-or Mi-
crosoft-with access to its Instant Messaging service, which
enjoys an overwhelming market share. With AOL's decision to
buy Time Warner, one can only imagine that those debates
have become much more interesting. AT&T, on the other hand,
has been forced to explain why open access to cable modems
would decrease incentives for investment, whereas the unbun-
dling of the incumbent's telecommunications network should
proceed apace. Coupled with these marketplace developments,
the Supreme Court's remand on the standard for unbundling
network elements should create a valuable opportunity for
policymakers and commentators to examine the open access is-
sue with greater care and forethought than the FCC was able
to muster in the compressed time frame in which it produced
its original local competition order.
In discussing "open access," it is essential to develop a
common vocabulary to facilitate a clearer and more principled
discussion of the issue. In particular, the FCC should focus
more carefully on the competitive costs and benefits of unbun-
dling physical and virtual facilities as distinct from costs in-
volved in mandating interconnection or compatibility to a
common standard with respect to an established customer
base. The "open access" umbrella thus encompasses three very
different phenomena: (1) competitive risks posed by control of
key facilities, which can be addressed by unbundling; (2) a
commitment to openness in and ubiquitous access to certain
technologies that requires an interconnection right, compatible
standards and/or common protocols; and (3) a "marketplace of
ideas" concern about control over key modes of communication
that necessitates regulatory intervention. In the interest of
brevity, I will limit my analysis to the first two points.34
34. Fortunately, others at the Symposium have decided to address the mar-
ketplace of ideas concern, which is clearly a very important issue for the FCC to
consider. Mark Cooper, for example, comments that, in the case of cable modems,
"it is interesting to note that even Wall Street analysts recognize the special
treatment of communication networks and the media. Simple arguments about
the market have never been the sole determinant of public policy." Mark Cooper,
Creating Open Access to the Broadband Internet, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1020
n.15 (2000); see also Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000,
at C5 ("[T]he free speech issue arises when a single entity, of any size, controls
both a transmission medium and the information that flows over it.").
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A. Unbundling
From an antitrust perspective, mandates to unbundle fa-
cilities-whether real or virtual-serve two purposes: first, to
prevent the use of market power in one market to disadvantage
competition in a second market; and second, to facilitate com-
petitive entry into a market where a company's entrenched
monopoly power would be extraordinarily difficult to overcome.
Courts and commentators generally refer to such actions under
the category of "exclusionary conduct," such as illegal tying or
exclusive dealing arrangements, which raises rivals' costs by
"locking up" either a necessary input or "foreclosing" access to a
significant segment of consumers." AT&T perfected a classic
form of such exclusionary conduct by requiring all customers
purchasing telephone service from it to rent their telephones
from AT&T as well, thereby impeding competition in the cus-
tomer equipment market.36 Similarly, Microsoft's policy of in-
tegrating its Internet Explorer browser into its Windows Oper-
ating System and not providing a version of its Operating
System without its browser utilized its market power in one
market to impede competition in an adjacent market." In both
cases, some type of an "unbundling" remedy could be used to
facilitate full and fair competition in the would-be competitive
market.
The Telecom Act envisioned the unbundling of an incum-
bent provider's proprietary network elements only where "nec-
essary," and where the lack of access to unbundled elements
would "impair" a competitor's ability to compete.3" In short, the
Act followed the antitrust law principle that a monopolist does
not have to provide its competitors with a helping hand if they
could get access to the requested element on their own.39 In the
telecommunications context, however, the historic monopoly
position of the local phone companies meant that access to the
35. See, e.g., X PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 1782a5 (1996)
("Tying is not unreasonable under the antitrust laws absent foreclosure in the tied
market or other genuine threat to competition.").
36. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
37. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 1999).
38. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
39. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d
370, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that new entrant had no right to the in-
cumbent monopolist's sales lists).
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"piece parts" of the local network would not always be avail-
able. Thus, new entrants would invariably need to rely on the
incumbent's network for at least some portion of time.4 °
As the Supreme Court held in Iowa Utilities Board, the Act
requires the FCC to develop a limiting principle to determine
what facilities must be unbundled pursuant to the "necessary
and impair" standard.41 Unlike the FCC's earlier approach,
which suggested a presumption in favor of unbundling and was
overturned by the Supreme Court, the FCC's revised rules,
which were developed on remand from the Supreme Court's de-
cision, take a more prudent course. In short, the new rules
properly appreciate that, in the case of investing in new facili-
ties, unbundling requirements should not attach where there
are alternatives to the incumbent's network.
The FCC's recent actions in the unbundling area demon-
strate a greater awareness of the importance of what should
not be unbundled (so as to encourage new investment) as well
as what is really important to facilitate new entry. In the con-
40. In short, the access to unbundled elements must be assessed "in light of
the existence of competition among different bundles of end services." Jerry A.
Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory
Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 425 (1999); see
also AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) ("given the Act's basic pur-
pose, it requires a convincing explanation of why facilities should be shared (or
'unbundled') where a new entrant could compete effectively without the facility, or
where practical alternatives to that facility are available.") (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
41. See AT&T, 525 U.S. at 387-92.
42. See Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Rel. No. FCC 99-238, at 8 (Sept. 15, 1999). As
Hausman and Sidak explained:
Regulatory use of cost-based rates (such as TELRIC) creates disincen-
tives for new investment and for innovation in telecommunications. If
the new investment succeeds, the CLEC [competitive local exchange car-
rier] can purchase the ILEC's [incumbent local exchange carrier's] un-
bundled element at cost, as set by TELRIC. If the new investment fails,
the CLEC does not bear any of the cost, but the ILEC's shareholders
bear the cost of the unsuccessful investment. Thus, [under such an ap-
proach,] the regulators force the incumbents to provide CLECs a free op-
tion on its investment.
Hausman & Sidak, supra note 40, at 458. In fairness to the FCC, it did recognize
this risk in its original order and sought to address it through raising the price of
access by adjusting the cost of capital component of its pricing methodology. See
Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, at 15,856 (Aug. 8, 1996). Nonetheless, I am skeptical
that such an approach, as opposed to not unbundling such facilities at all, would
prove viable or successful.
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text of the development of advanced services, for example, the
FCC rightly concluded that incumbent providers need not pro-
vide competitors with access to packet switches, which are used
to process data communication.43 In essence, the FCC con-
cluded that these are new facilities that entrants can easily
purchase and employ, provided they receive the necessary co-
operation from the incumbent providers.44 At the same time,
the FCC properly concluded that collocation space in incum-
bent central offices, which is necessary to access local phone
lines, must be shared on appropriately fair terms. 45 With re-
gard to such space, the incumbent providers would save them-
selves much heartache by contracting out the management of
central office collocation space to a neutral third party, who
could take responsibility for providing collocation services. In
so doing, the incumbent providers would remove themselves
from a position to "gate" the entry of their competitors and be a
target of regulatory and antitrust scrutiny.
With the Supreme Court's decision in Iowa Utilities Board
and the subsequent FCC decision on unbundled elements be-
hind us, the open access issue du jour is whether AT&T and
other cable operators should provide open access to their cable
modems. AT&T has sought to address this issue, which led to
a lawsuit in response to the City of Portland's attempt to im-
pose such a mandate, 4 by agreeing to enter into a business ar-
rangement with Mindspring two years from now.47 Advocates
of "open access," including most Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"), nonetheless remain vigilant on this topic.4" The
regulatory battle shows no sign of ending, though AOL's
43. See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Release No. FCC 99-238 (Executive
Summary section).
44. See id. Similarly, the Commission concluded that incumbent local ex-
change carriers ("LECs") need not provide access to their operator services plat-
form if incumbent LECs provide the necessary customized routing-so that com-
petitive LECs can route their own calls-and directory listings to provide
competitive operator services. See id.
45. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunica-
tions Capability, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4788-89 (1999), and references cited therein,
affd in part and rev'd in part by GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 2000 WL 255470 (D.C.
Cir. Mar 17, 2000).
46. See AT&T v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999).
47. See Alan K. Ota, Critics Say AT&T's 'Open Access' Would Still Shut Out
Competitors, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2969, 2969 (1999).
48. See id.
20001
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evolving stance on this topic-in response to its pending pur-
chase of Time Warner-is bound to make it more interesting.49
At the dawn of the broadband era, the FCC, local fran-
chising authorities, and Congress are left to guess about the
possible future dominance of cable modems and the emergence
of a potentially captive customer base. According to traditional
antitrust law standards, cable modems would need to capture
over twenty-five percent of the relevant customer base in order
to conceivably pose a threat to exclude entry into upstream
markets such as electronic commerce or internet content.50 To
establish that cable modems constitute an essential facility,
advocates of unbundling this facility would need to demon-
strate that potential service delivery alternatives, such as Digi-
tal Subscriber Line ("DSL") (whether provided by incumbents
or new entrants), high speed wireless, and satellite are not suf-
ficient to constrain any market power garnered by cable mo-
dem providers.51
After weighing the competitive pros and cons, there is
sound cause for hesitation before imposing new unbundling ob-
ligations, whether on cable modems or on other new technolo-
gies. Imposing an unbundling mandate on cable modems,
packet switches, or AOL's Instant Messaging will undoubtedly
deter investment in those areas-after all, why invest in new
facilities, intellectual property, or a customer base when you
will not be able to appropriate all returns on this investment?
For this reason, antitrust law imposes no general duty to
share.52 In other words, the challenge here is to harmonize the
49. See Caruso, supra note 34 (reporting fears that AOL's once ardent open
access stance may "evolve").
50. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st
Cir. 1993).
51. The City of Portland, for example, seemed inclined to accept the charac-
terization of cable modems as an essential facility. See City of Portland, 43 F.
Supp. 2d at 1150. The "essential facility" doctrine stems from the 1912 Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In
short, the essential facility doctrine has focused most intently on the consequences
of "vertical integration-in particular, the duty of a vertically integrated monopo-
list to share some input in a vertically related market [e.g., the provision of
broadband access to the internet] with someone operating in an upstream or
downstream market [e.g., the provision of internet content or e-mail]." IIIA
AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW $ 771a, at 172 (1995).
52. Thus, Professor Areeda explained that "[clompulsory access, if it exists
at all, is and should be very exceptional." Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An
Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1990). The
essential facilities cases highlight this point again and again. See, e.g., Alaska
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basic goal of the intellectual property regime, which is to en-
courage innovation,53 and the basic goal of antitrust law, which
is to prevent the abuse of monopoly power. 4 Thus, with re-
spect to cable modems and other new technologies, sound com-
petition policy counsels against categorical restrictions and in-
trusion into the marketplace until experience proves that the
threat of exclusionary conduct is real and not merely imag-
ined.55
Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
control over passenger reservation system is not sufficiently susceptible to abuse
to constitute an essential facility); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a new entrant had no
right to its competitors' sales lists). Thus, while I would agree with Mark Cooper
that "[tihe tools of discrimination must be controlled or taken out of the hands of
network monopolists to prevent them from using their market power over facili-
ties to undermine competition or stifle creativity in programming and content,"
see Cooper, supra note 34, at 1016, I cannot conclude that, based upon current
market conditions, cable modems-as opposed to, say, the local loop or Microsoft's
Windows--constitute a monopoly service.
53. As Professor Areeda succinctly explained with regard to forced licensing
of patents, "diminishing the inventor's reward reduces incentives for inventive ac-
tivity and seems inconsistent with the premise of the patent system." III AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, $ 707, at 180 (rev. ed. 1996); see also, e.g., Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that the
limited copyright monopoly "is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward"); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copy-
right law is to secure a fair return for 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good."); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186-87
(1st Cir. 1994) ("[IUn passing the Copyright Act, Congress itself made an empirical
assumption that allowing copyright holders to collect license fees and exclude oth-
ers from using their works creates a system of incentives that promotes consumer
welfare in the long term by encouraging investment.. . ."); SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]he essence of a patent is the mo-
nopoly or exclusionary power it confers upon the holder").
54. As Professor Areeda put it:
Forcing a firm to share its inputs with a rival is an exceptionally drastic
antitrust remedy, having the consequences of preserving the monopoly
and often of turning the defendant's facility into what amounts to a pub-
lic utility .... Antitrust's purpose is not to permit particular rivals to
survive, but to make markets more competitive. If the market can be
made more competitive without forcing the defendant to share the facil-
ity, then granting the relief undermines antitrust's purpose.
IIIA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 51, $1 773b3, at 206; see also id. $ 774c, at
220 ("An important consequence of [forced] sharing is that the plaintiff or alterna-
tive suppliers to the plaintiff lose some or all of the incentive to produce an alter-
native to the input on their own.").
55. As Professor Areeda explained:
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B. Architecture, Interconnection, and Open Access
Some advocates of "unbundling" cable modems focus on the
threat to the "open architecture of the Internet."56 Unlike the
essential facilities justification, which can be rejected on anti-
trust grounds, this argument for "open access" requires a more
nuanced examination. Unlike the unbundling argument, de-
veloping open architecture policies-which is not necessarily
the same as mandating shared access to an essential facility, or
a non-essential facility, as in the case of cable modems-is well
[A]ntitrust begins with the premise that its 'regulatory' domain is those
markets in which competition and other free market forces can be ex-
pected to work acceptably well, but which may require occasional legal
intervention addressing problems of monopoly, oligopoly, or collusion. If
the facts do not support a fairly unambiguous judgment that interven-
tion will make things better, however, then the best course of action for
the antitrust tribunal is to not intervene at all.
I AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 112, at 131 (rev. ed. 1997). It is
rather soon to make a judgment about cable modems, given that the incumbent
LECs appear to have just recently begun to seriously roll out their DSL offerings.
The ILECs appear to have just recently focused on the imperative of the high-
speed broadband race, suggesting that they may have underestimated the need to
deploy a broadband offering or viewed it as a threat to their existing offerings.
See Michael Powell, June 15, 1999 Remarks Before the Federal Communications
Bar Association (Chicago Chapter) (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http:ll
www.FCC.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp902.html> ("[Ulpgrades to cable plant have
intensified a potential competitive threat that has led, I believe, to heightened in-
vestment in alternative broadband technology by other firms."); Hearing on
Broadband: Competition and Consumer Choice in High-Speed Internet Services
and Technologies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (testimony of Kevin M.
Moore, Director, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown), July 14, 1999 (visited Feb. 14,
2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/71499kmm.htm> ("We believe that it is
the success of the cable modem that is causing the current wave of RBOC [re-
gional Bell operating company] investment in DSL services.... We believe that
the primary reason for lack of innovation is that ultimately, every new innovation
either creates opportunities for RBOC competitors and/or cannibalizes existing
services, neither of which is good for the RBOCs.").
56. See Letter from Jeffrey Chester, Center for Media Education Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility et al., to William E. Kennard, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission (Jan. 27, 1998), available at Fight the
Gatekeepers! (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.nogatekeepers.org/archive/
19990127-1.shtml> (expressing concern that "closed cable model will become the
industry norm, eroding the openness and innovation that has made the Internet
what it is today."); Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor
Lawrence Lessig, CS Docket No. 99-251, 38-39 Application for Consent to the
Transfer of Control of Licenses MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T, available at (vis-
ited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessigMB.html> [herein-
after Lemley & Lessig] (arguing that a lack of an "open access" mandate would
allow AT&T to alter the open architecture of the Internet).
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worth considering, albeit with some appropriate skepticism.
Indeed, AOL, the once-champion of unbundling cable modems,
has made this very distinction with regard to access to its In-
stant Messaging service.5
The central question related to open architecture concerns
is whether "locked in" customers will face difficulties in ac-
cessing the "open internet." In particular, policymakers should
be concerned about whether customers might be restricted
from reaching certain sites or face degraded interconnection
arrangements between providers.5" In the cable modem con-
text, Professors Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig argue
that such problems might exist, suggesting that AT&T would
have the ability and incentive to limit the types of services that
users can access59 and would exercise its power over what
services might be used on its network."
Similar to the case of AT&T's cable modems, AOL might
make it impossible for its users to connect to rival chat rooms
or Instant Messaging services.61 To be sure, such actions by
AT&T or AOL would diminish the value of their respective
networks, but they might still make sense to each company in
order to diminish the ability of rivals to build up their customer
bases.62
57. See New Media, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL
7580968 (reporting that AOL allows "interconnection" to its Instant Messaging
and that limits on access to Microsoft resulted from "Microsoft's attempt to piggy-
back on AOL infrastructure").
58. See Dale Hatfield, Keynote Address at Communications Management
Day (Ohio University, Apr. 27, 1999), Policy and Regulatory Issues: The Rapid
Growth of the Internet, 3 (Apr. 27, 1999) (on file with the University of Colorado
Law Review) ("This emphasis on openness not only facilitates access by end users
but also facilitates the interconnection of the private and public networks of which
the Internet is comprised.").
59. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 56, at 28.
60. See id. at 23.
61. See Don Clark, AOL and Apple Team Up to Offer Instant Messaging,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 1999, at B6 (noting that Instant Messaging could be a very
important platform and discussing efforts to create open access to AOL's customer
base); Don Clark, Internet Rivals Attempt to Open Up AOL's Instant Message Sys-
tem, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1999, at B2 (detailing AOL's efforts to keep other serv-
ices from accessing its Instant Messaging platform).
62. See Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201,
203-04 (1996) (explaining how Bell used this strategy of refusing to interconnect
with independents to exclude rivals despite the fact that it also limited the value
of Bell's network); MILTON L. MUELLER JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 45-46 (1997)
(same).
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Turning once again to antitrust principles, we can take
heart that dominant firms will not generally choose to act in
the manner feared by Lemley and Lessig. As Professor James
Speta convincingly explains, even a dominant firm generally
will not choose to limit its installed base of customers' access to
complementary services, because doing so would limit the
value that customers enjoy from remaining on that firm's net-
work.63 Apple, for example, made a grave mistake in limiting
access to its operating system so that other hardware manufac-
turers could not produce Apple-compatible computers, which
would have raised the value of the Apple network.64 For this
reason, AT&T claims that it will not limit its customers' access
to online service providers' applications and their networks,65
and many believe that the cable companies will voluntarily
open up their networks to resellers of broadband access.66
63. Written Ex Parte of Assistant Professor James B. Speta, Application for
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses MediaOne Group, Inc. to AT&T, CS
No. 99-251, 8-12, available at (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://pubweb.
nwu.edu/-jsp381/>; id. at 9 ("In fact, a monopolist generally has every incentive to
encourage innovation and competition in adjacent markets.").
64. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 56, at 15. As one analyst explained:
Consumers who, at comparable prices and speeds, can get unlimited
choice of content over the telcos vs. limited choice over their cable net-
work are not likely to opt for the cable network. Beta v. VHS and Apple
vs. Microsoft both tell us that customers primarily care about content
and applications and will flock to the vendor that gives them the best
and widest selection of each.
Competition and Consumer Choice in High-Speed Internet Services and Technolo-
gies: Hearings on Broadband Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 3 (July 14, 1999)
(statement of Anna-Maria Kovacs, First Vice President, Janney Montgomery
Scott), available at (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/
71499amk.htm>.
65. As AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong has stated:
Some [On-Line Service Providers] have been publicly worrying that the
new broadband model we're launching might keep them out by denying
our customers access to their services. But there's no way that should
happen. That wouldn't be in our best interests, or the best interests of
our customers. Our message to the OSPs is: If you've got a service our
customers want, we want you on our system.
Michael Armstrong, Telecom and Cable TV: Shared Prospects for the Communica-
tions Future, Address Before the Washington Metropolitan Cable Club, Nov. 2,
1998, at 3-4, available at C. Michael Armstrong, Nov. 2, 1998 (visited Feb. 19,
2000) <http://www.att.com/speeches/98/981102.maa.html>.
66. Moore, supra note 55, at 4 ("We believe that AT&T would rather have
the online providers utilizing its facilities instead of someone else's."); see also
Hearings, supra note 64, at 2 (testimony of Anna-Maria Kovacs) ("I believe that
the deployment of DSL, in turn, will spur the cable industry to insure that it of-
fers consumers a choice in content, content providers, and gateways that is com-
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Despite the likelihood that a monopolist will encourage the
development and deployment of complementary products, a
monopolist might, in some cases, view certain products as a
threat to its installed base and thus limit openness to protect
its position. AOL, for example, might be inclined to limit ac-
cess to its Instant Messaging so that customers remain com-
mitted to its own "killer application." Similarly, AT&T might
choose to limit streaming video to protect its core cable opera-
tions. Such episodes, if found to be exclusionary, would justify
a lighter regulatory touch-say, a ban on blocking access to
URLs or on unreasonable limits on streaming video-to protect
the openness of the internet. To demonstrate that such actions
were exclusionary, one would need to establish that switching
costs, be they from AOL or AT&T, were sufficiently great and
unanticipated so as to lock customers into a specific provider,
thus preventing them from switching in response to any exclu-
sionary restrictions.67
The important point of facilitating open access to custom-
ers-as opposed to mandating the sharing of facilities-is that
the economics of interconnection are far more likely to justify
regulatory intervention than the economics of essential facili-
ties. The essence of this type of openness argument is that it is
important to keep the costs of innovation down by ensuring
that a broad customer base-all with access to an open and
parable to what the telcos can offer."); Few Regulatory Obstacles Seen For AOL
Time Warner, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 11, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4694269 (re-
porting that "'[t]here's not many cases of closed access working very well, re-
stricting content to one location and making people come to you .... It would be a
mistake for them to limit consumers to only AOL or Time Warner content, and I
think they get that."').
67. For an explanation of switching costs and the lock-in effect, see CARL
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 103-39 (1999). See also Kodak
v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 473-75 (1992). For a suggestion that the
conduct described above is unlikely to occur, see Powell, supra note 555, at 7 ("The
day someone sees a web URL on the side of a bus for a cool store that sells a
jacket they want, and the cable company's portal does not let them get there, or
impedes their ability to get there, I would not want to be on the customer service
line when the call came in."). Regulators should be mindful that even intercon-
nection mandates, if applied to situations where a firm created a market that an-
other company could also create or replicate, can discourage socially valuable in-
vestment. See Farrell, supra note 62, at 210 ("Just as we would not want to
reduce the life of a patent from seventeen years to seventeen minutes, since that
would reduce innovative effort, so also it would be unwise policy to make all de-
velopers of network externalities share them in all circumstances.").
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standardized protocol-will be able to utilize a new product.6"
Thus, by ensuring openness through no more restrictive means
than necessary, regulators can facilitate new entry where cus-
tomers might otherwise be "locked in" to a closed system with
high switching costs.69
The economics of interconnection are aptly illustrated by
the framework employed in the Lotus case. 70 The case exam-
ined whether Borland could utilize Lotus' familiar command
hierarchy without infringing its copyright.71 At a broader level,
this case addressed the appropriate level of copyright protec-
tion to afford to user interfaces with which users had become
familiar at some time and expense.72 In concluding that Lotus
did not deserve protection for the command hierarchy, Judge
Michael Boudin suggested that withholding copyright protec-
tion is warranted where "one places a very high value on public
access to a useful innovation that may be the most efficient
means of performing a given task."" Put differently, when pro-
tecting an innovation from open access would threaten to
"fenc[e] off access to a commons,"74 such protection would more
likely limit, rather than enhance, consumer welfare. 7' As for
68. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 56, at 9 ("By keeping the cost of innova-
tion low, it has encouraged an extraordinary amount of innovation.").
69. See Hatfield, supra note 58, at 5 (The Internet's open architecture "en-
courages innovation because it results in an open, standards-based, general-
purpose platform upon which even the smallest of entrepreneurs can create new
businesses and revolutionize old ones.").
70. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l., Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
71. Id. at 820.
72. For an overview of the case law in this area, see Mark L. Gordon, Copy-
ing To Compete: The Tension Between Copyright Protection and Antitrust Policy in
Recent Non-Literal Computer Program Copyright Infringement Cases, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 171, 187 (1996) (concluding that "[tihe courts
are addressing monopoly concerns [arising from users being locked-in to a par-
ticular command hierarchy] by scaling back copyright protection in an attempt to
promote growth in the computer technology field").
73. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 819.
74. Id.
75. As Judge Boudin explained,
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why customers
who have learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it should re-
main captives of Lotus because of an investment in learning made by the
users and not by Lotus. Lotus has already reaped a substantial reward
for being first; assuming that the Borland program is now better, good
reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus customers: to enable the
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the present open architecture of the Internet Protocol, this rea-
soning applies wholeheartedly, particularly because such
openness constitutes an important safeguard against any firm
monopolizing the internet.76
III. THE MISSION OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
The era of the administrative state has never before wit-
nessed the transformation of an agency focused on protecting
consumers in a world of regulated monopolies to an agency fo-
cused on enforcement and consumer protection in a world of
emerging competition. Nonetheless, it is quickly becoming
conventional wisdom that technological change and the emer-
gence of competition require such a "re-missioning" of federal
and state agencies.7 7 Other deregulatory initiatives, such as
those in airlines and in rail, left the anachronistic administra-
tive agencies to the scrap heap of history.78 The challenge of
shifting an agency's focus to acting in aid of the market, in-
stead of in place of it, has led Peter Huber, among others, to
suggest abolishing the FCC altogether.7 9 Given the incumbent
old customers to take advantage of a new advance, and to reward Bor-
land in turn for making a better product.
Id. at 821.
76. See JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET
5 (OPP Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at <httpJ/www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/
OPP/working-papers/oppwp3l.txt>) (The internet's "openness is driven by the
sharing of that common communications protocol: IP, the Internet protocol, devel-
oped by early Internet pioneers. No one owns the Internet protocol, no one li-
censes its use, and no one restricts access to it."); see also Michael Powell, Address
before the Federal Communications Bar Association (Chicago Chapter) 3 (June
15, 1999), available at <http://www.FCC.gov/powell/speeches>. As Professor Les-
sig explains, the danger of owning the commons that forms the Internet experi-
ence is that "[i]f the code of cyberspace is owned ... it can be controlled; if it is not
owned, control is much more difficult." LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 7 (1999).
77. See John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ambi-
tions, Heroic Institutions, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1071 (2000); Roger Fillian, Change Blowing PUC's Way, DENVER POST, Jan. 9,
2000, at K1 (noting the changing role of telecommunications regulation).
78. See Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1746, 1750 (1999) ("[T]o judge from the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, federal agencies that regulate networks appear
uniquely vulnerable to fatal reforms.").
79. See PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE
FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 7 (1997) (arguing that the FCC
"should shut its doors once and for all").
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providers' considerable monopoly power in pricing access to
their local loops and allowing for interconnection, this proposal
seems farfetched."0 Nonetheless, we should take its provoca-
tive thesis seriously: administrative agency reform is a lost
cause, and the FCC will be doomed to repeat past anticompeti-
tive decisions."
As we mark the fourth anniversary of the Telecom Act,
which came just after the first Baby Bell entered the in-region
long distance market, 2 it seems appropriate to envision a
regulatory regime premised on enforcing pro-competitive and
pro-consumer mandates, not on limiting entry and exit and
regulating rates.8 3 Much to the FCC's credit, it has set out a
blueprint for this transition, highlighting the important role to
be played by an Enforcement Division in its new structure. s4
Ideally, this model would address Huber's core criticism of
agency regulation: that it prevents innovative action on the
front end, rather than deterring or addressing such action
through back-end enforcement, a problem not faced by common
80. See Joseph D. Kearney, Twilight of the FCC?, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 327, 329
(1998) ("Huber has virtually nothing to say on how non-discriminatory and rea-
sonably priced interconnection would be ensured under his proposal. This is a no-
table shortcoming.").
81. Among FCC past errors are its six-year delay in allowing MCI to enter
the private line long distance market and its twelve-year delay in allowing entry
into the mobile telephone market after it was technically feasible. See John W.
Berresford, The Future of the FCC: Promote Competition, Then Relax, 50 ADMIN.
L. REV. 731, 736 (1998).
82. See Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Sec-
tion 271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in
the State of New York, CC Docket No. 99-404, Rel. No. FCC 99-404, at pt.3 (Dec.
22, 1999).
83. Indeed, in concluding that Bell Atlantic should be permitted to enter the
long distance market in New York, FCC Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth pointed to
the importance of enforcement in superintending the Act's pro-competitive man-
dates. See id. (Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, concurring statement)
("While I do not purport to assert that the section 251/252 process necessarily es-
tablishes the exclusive remedy for disgruntled BOC interconnectors, I do view
with skepticism assertions of inadequate BOC performance lodged for the first
time in the section 271 approval process.").
84. See A New FCC For The Twenty First Century (visited Feb. 23, 2000)
<http://www.fcc.gov/21st-century/draft-strategic-plan.txt>; see also William E.
Kennard, Federal Agency Focus: Federal Communications Commission, 50 ADMIN.
L. REV. 723, 730 (1998) (noting that the FCC is working to repeal, or forbear from
enforcing, regulations that "may have been useful when the FCC actively man-
dated conduct and outcomes in the regulated-monopoly markets, but they are
useless and even counterproductive today").
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law processes.85 In casting a qualified vote of confidence in the
agency's future, I join Professor Joseph Kearney in suggesting
that we must question what new model will best serve the
agency's new mission, as the old model is best left to the scrap
heap of history alongside the now abandoned Interstate Com-
merce Commission. 6
To take just one context where the FCC will need to de-
velop workable processes for a new era, let me focus on its
merger review process. And in focusing on the FCC's process, I
should say that many of my criticisms and suggestions also
hold for parallel state processes. In my view, the FCC's actions
in this area risks running afoul of two concerns: (1) failing to
develop manageable standards; and (2) imposing conditions
that it will be unlikely to enforce.
Over thirty-five years ago, Judge Henry Friendly remarked
that the prime flaw with administrative agencies is their "fail-
ure to develop standards sufficiently definite that decisions will
be fairly predictable and that the reasons for them will be un-
derstood ..8.7." This concern seems quite compelling with re-
gard to what AT&T/Media One or Bell Atlantic/GTE might ex-
pect under the public interest standard applied by the FCC. In
reviewing mergers, some state commissions, like the New York
Public Service Commission, appear to focus more intently on
core concerns like quality of service standards and rebates, to
ensure that consumers benefit from the efficiencies that a
merger will occasion." Other commissions, like the Illinois
Commerce Commission, impose wide-ranging conditions, such
85. See HUBER, supra note 79, at 8. Although Huber declines to give the
FCC credit for much of anything, he does acknowledge that the soundness of the
Commission's Carterfone decision and refusal to regulate the customer premises
equipment market were important predicates to the rise of the Internet. See id.
at 78-79.
86. See Joseph D. Kearney, Will the FCC Go the Way of the ICC?, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1153 (2000).
87. Henry Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need For Bet-
ter Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863, 867 (1962).
88. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission as to the Joint Petition of
New York Telephone Company, NYNEX Corporation, and Bell Atlantic Corpora-
tion for a Declaratory Ruling that the Commission Lacks Jurisdiction to Investi-
gate and Approve a Proposed Merger between NYNEX and a Subsidiary of Bell
Atlantic or, in the Alternative, for Approval of Merger, Case 96-C-0603 (State of
New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 20, 1997) (order approving proposed merger
subject to conditions) available at (visited Mar. 21, 2000) <http://www.dps.
state.ny.us/fileroom/docl6l9.pdf>
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as the mandate that SBC-Ameritech roll out DSL service in
every central office in the state.8 9  To some extent, Congress
must share the blame for the uncertainty in this area, as, with
rare exceptions such as the prophylactic limits on mergers be-
tween cable and telephone companies in the same service
area,9" it left the FCC without much guidance in how to proceed
through this thorny area. Hopefully, the FCC will develop
some clear rules and standards in this area to facilitate a more
expeditious merger review process and provide guidance to the
industry, but its record on this score thus far is hardly inspir-
ing.9 To be fair, I cannot say that I have developed a particu-
larly compelling vision of how the public interest standard
should be defined in this context, other than to include the
Clayton Act's standards, which are already enforced by the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. I can
say, however, that an inconsistent and vague application will
be ineffective and will strengthen the case for limiting the
FCC's mission not only in the merger review area, but in other
areas as well.92
89. See Illinois Commerce Commission Website, SBC/Ameritech Reorgani-
zation, Final Summary of Conditions (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www.icc.state.
il.us/icc/tc/sbc.asp>.
90. See 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. III 1997).
91. Commissioner Powell has spoken very eloquently on this subject. See
Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc.,
Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission
Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications
Act and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95 and 101 of the Commission's Rules, 14
F.C.C.R. 14712, 15197 (1999) (Powell, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part);
Michael Powell, 10/6/99 Separate Statement of Commissioner Michael Powell
(last modified Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.FCC.gov/Speeches/Powell/Statements/
stmkp929.html> ("I have particular concerns that in an effort to have these condi-
tions carry weight by making them extensive and detailed, we may actually con-
fuse the industry and our sister authorities as to the Commission's position on the
subjects covered."); Federal Communications Commission Reform for the New
Millennium: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Telecommunications
Trade & Consumer Protection of the House Comm. On Commerce, (October 26,
1999) (Prepared Statement of the Honorable Michael K. Powell), from Federal In-
formation Systems Corporation Federal News Service, available in Congressional
Universe (online service) ("While I believe that there is room to preserve a com-
plementary role for the FCC in the review of mergers, we need to have some disci-
plined procedures and limiting principles to ensure the rapid processing of such
transactions, to preserve the rights of the parties and to avoid duplication with
other authorities.").
92. One recently suggested approach would be for the FCC to essentially
follow antitrust law standards in applying the public interest standard. See Wil-
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Coupled with the challenge of developing consistent and
manageable standards is the challenge of ensuring that the
conditions imposed as part of approving a merger will be en-
forced. The combination of seemingly elastic and unhelpful
standards, along with conditions that are unlikely to be en-
forced, can only undermine the sense that the agency's mission
respects basic rule of law values." The recently created En-
forcement Bureau may be up to the challenging task ahead of
it,94 but the cultural change necessary to pull off this effort may
well prove too daunting for an agency whose core mission has
been command and control regulation since its creation.9"
Thus, the type of discussion sparked by Professor John Duffy's
call to model regulation on the patent system is the right sort
of approach for thinking about new models of telecommunica-
tions regulation.96 Personally, I am more intrigued by different
governance structures, such as specialized courts or industry
self-regulatory bodies under FCC oversight, to ensure that dis-
putes in this area are handled quickly and effectively.97 Never-
theless, at this point, we need to consider all possible options.
lV. THE INTERNET
Historians may look back at the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 and see a carefully crafted policy to keep the internet
liam H. Read & Ronald Alan Weiner, FCC Reform: Governing Requires A New
Standard, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 289 (1997).
93. Chairman Kennard has acknowledged such criticism, but insists that
the Commission will enforce the commitments made by SBC in connection with
its merger with Ameritech. See William E. Kennard, Remarks Before the Com-
petitive Carrier Summit 2000, available at Chairman Kennard's 1/19/2000 Re-
marks "The FCC's New Enforcement Ethic" before the Competitive Carrier Summit
2000, Conference on Current U.S. Telecom Policy in Washington, D.C. (last modi-
fied Jan. 19, 2000) <http://www.FCC.gov/Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwek003.
html>.
94. See FCC Is Focused On Enforcement, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at B4
(quoting Chairman Kennard as stating that "We are refocusing a lot of the atten-
tion of the agency right now to enforcement.").
95. Chairman Kennard acknowledges this challenge, but insists that the
new bureau will be a part of "changing the culture of enforcement at the FCC."
Kennard, supra note 93.
96. See Duffy, supra note 77.
97. The Securities and Exchange Commission's reliance on the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers ("NASD") is one example of such an approach. See
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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free from regulation,"8 particularly with all of the calls for the
"unregulation of the Internet."9' It seems to me, however, that
Congress did not fully grasp the importance of the internet in
this landmark legislation, but simply took modest steps to im-
munize ISPs from liability00 and to ban certain indecent com-
munications. 1°' Given the interests at stake, the debate over
how to treat the internet will only heat up in the years to come.
Without getting too deep into this debate, let me suggest that
policymakers will face questions related to both the internet's
communications infrastructure and the administration of the
internet. I will briefly address each in turn.
A. Internet Communications
The regulatory pedigree of the internet stems from the
FCC's creation of an "enhanced services" classification, over
which it claimed jurisdiction (as ancillary to its regulation of
basic services), but forbore from regulating.' 2 Before the rise
of the internet, this basic policy made sense: companies that
purchased telecommunications for data processing services
should remain free of FCC regulation. The use of internet
technology to provide voice telephony and streaming video,
however, will threaten to undermine the existing common car-
rier and content regulation regimes if this issue is left unad-
dressed.
I believe that the FCC has no choice other than to struggle
with the challenges posed by the internet. We are in the midst
of an historic transition from a world where data is carried on a
voice network to a world in which voice will be carried on a
data network that will not differentiate between video, voice,
data, or other forms of communication.'0 ' As Commissioner
98. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
99. See generally Oxman, supra note 76.
100. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. III 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
101. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. III 1997); Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
102. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 432-33 (1980) (final decision). Numerous commen-
tators have detailed this history. See Oxman, supra note 76; Steve Bickerstaff,
Shackles on the Giant: How The Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal
Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7-21 (1999).
103. See Moore, supra note 55.
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Powell succinctly put it, "if you don't believe that [current]
regulatory choices... have a direct and indirect effect on the
development of the Internet, you're really missing some-
thing.""4 Among other challenges, the FCC will be forced, over
the next year alone, to confront the issue of how calls to ISPs
should be treated for purposes of reciprocal compensation ar-
rangements and whether internet telephony should be placed
within the access charge system.0 5 Moreover, some commenta-
tors are also asking whether the internet backbone market,
which carries all internet traffic and ensures ubiquitous con-
nectivity between users, should remain unregulated and free of
any interconnection obligation.0 6
B. Internet Administration
I suspect that everyone who opposes "regulation of' the
internet" means something different by "regulation." To some,
this means relying on self-regulation, market mechanisms, or
social norms, without the force of legal sanctions, to regulate
The bottom line is that 95% of the world's legislation/regulation is cur-
rently oriented to what will be 5% of the world's traffic.... The last sev-
eral years of debate and litigation around reciprocal compensation for
ISPs illustrates the amount of energy and resources that can be wasted
when regulatory policies do not consider the Internet.
Id.
104. FCC Commissioner Ponders Extent of Regulation Among Rivals on
Internet, 77 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 417, 417 (Oct. 14, 1999); see also
Bickerstaff, supra note 102, at 6 ("In effect, the FCC directly and indirectly went
about creating a regulatory structure that, despite numerous intervening deci-
sions over almost thirty years, still shapes the computer services marketplace and
effectively subsidizes public use of the Internet.").
105. For a discussion of the reciprocal compensation issue, see Kasey A.
Chappelle, Comment, The End of the Beginning: Theories And Practical Aspects of
Reciprocal Compensation for Internet Traffic, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 393
(1999). For a discussion of the internet telephony issue, see Dennis W. Moore, Jr.,
Regulation of the Internet and Internet Telephony Through the Imposition of Ac-
cess Charges, 76 TEX. L. REV. 183, 184-85 (1997).
106. See Hatfield, supra note 58, at 6 ("Outright refusals to interconnect or
failure to develop proper financial arrangements can lead to fragmentation of the
network.... Evidence of this fragmentation is indicated by large newspaper ads
by large, backbone ISPs indicating the superior performance they can provide if
the traffic stays on the network from end-to-end."); Hal R. Varian, Manager's
Journal: How To Strengthen The Internet Backbone, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1998, at
A22.
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private conduct. 10 7  To others, internet regulation means al-
lowing existing common law regimes to develop conceptions of
property that might protect against trespass-say, unauthor-
ized use of a web site-or privacy.' 8  In the case of the United
States government's decision on how to privatize internet gov-
ernance, "unregulation" means setting up a nonprofit corpora-
tion to oversee the assignment and use of domain names.0 9
Ironically, at the same time that many in Congress and else-
where are calling for the unregulation of the internet, Congress
is seeking to develop statutory frameworks for perplexing
internet public policy challenges ranging from "cybersquat-
ting"" to protecting consumer privacy."'
107. For an explanation of how forces other than "law" regulate conduct, see
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-66 (1998)
(discussing how markets, social norms, and architecture all regulate conduct).
108. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998). A property rights regime to protect informational pri-
vacy would enable individuals to choose when-and for how much-to sell rights
to their privacy entitlement. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (noting that where the state protects an entitle-
ment by recognizing a property right, "someone who wishes to remove the enti-
tlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction").
109. See Lawrence Lessig, Jefferson's Nature 14-15 (Mar. 27, 1999)
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessigNatureD3.pdf>; see also Statement of
Policy, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741 (1998);
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers <http://www.icann.org
general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm>.
110. "Cybersquatting" involves the use of domain names to infringe on a
firm's trademark. See G. Gervaise Davis III, Internet Domain Names and Trade-
marks: Recent Developments in Domestic and International Disputes, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 601 (1999). Just last year, Congress passed a new
law, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which provides new tools
for addressing cybersquatting. See Appendix to Pub. L. No. 106-113 (S. 1948)
§ 3002 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)); Michael D. Bednarek & John I.
Stewart, Jr., Cyberpirates, Beware, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at C1.
111. See Gilmore Proposes "No New Taxes" On Internet, COMM. DAILY, Jan.
11, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4694272 (quoting House Commerce Committee
Chairman Tom Bliley (R-Va.) as stating that government "needs a solution" for
Internet privacy). Professor Yochai Benkler explains that all such efforts share
the common thread of "perceiv[ing] a destabilizing effect that the Net has on the
pre-Net equilibrium of control over certain kinds of information, and all intervene
to settle the lack of equilibrium by setting the parameters for a new pattern of
control over the information flows on the Net." Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation:
Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1238 (2000).
Other commentators have also hailed how the Internet will require new regula-
tory approaches. See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, Piracy on the Net: Why It Needs More
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At this point in the internet's development, I doubt that
there will be a simple model for "regulating" the internet or
"keeping it unregulated," for that matter. Whether the FCC,
another regulatory agency, or common law courts will be
authorized to regulate internet behavior under the mantle of
privacy protection, protecting children, safeguarding competi-
tion, or resolving commercial disputes is an open question that
may not be decided for some time. Moreover, the ultimate an-
swer may depend on how existing legal regimes-such as anti-
trust, intellectual property, and constitutional law-adapt
themselves to this new medium.112 I, like Professor Yochai
Benkler,113 hope the debate over what regulatory regime to em-
ploy for the internet continues, and is not settled prematurely.
I also hope policymakers reap the benefits of different experi-
ments in how to address the perplexing public policy challenges
raised by the internet."' Indeed, spectrum policy might have
Policing, Business Week, Jan. 24, 2000, at 28 ("An unregulated Net is also a men-
ace to personal privacy. The Wild West days of the Net are probably numbered.").
112. Just recently, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Ut.) made the oft-noted point
that if antitrust enforcement cannot preserve competition, then the cries for
regulation are less likely to fall on deaf ears. See John R. Wilke & David Bank,
Sen. Hatch Issues Warning Microsoft May Be Building "Proprietary Internet,"
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6. 1998, at B15 (Senator Hatch noted, with respect to the possi-
bility of Microsoft illegally gaining market power over Internet browsers, that
"[v]igilant and effective antitrust enforcement today is preferable to the heavy
hand of government regulation of the Internet tomorrow"). Mindful of this point,
one antitrust court explained that "courts must be careful not to abdicate their
responsibilities under the Antitrust laws in the name of expedience. When the
adverse effect of allowing a monopolist to maintain certain practices is clear, a
court should stay its hand rarely, if ever." Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609
F.2d 843, 864 n.57 (6th Cir. 1979), affd on appeal after remand, 683 F.2d 981,
(6th Cir. 1982).
113. See Benkler, supra note 111.
We should look at what it is about the digitally networked environment
that destabilized the relations of control over information. Once we
know the cause of the concern, we can begin to imagine fixes, and we can
begin to imagine the kinds of dynamic effects that different kinds of fixes
will have.
Id. at 1258.
114. This includes courts, too, who are struggling mightily to determine the
proper conception of the First Amendment's impact on governmental regulation of
informational privacy and source code. See, e.g., US West v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224,
(10th Cir. 1999); Bernstein v. United States Dept. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141
(9th Cir. 1999), reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir.
1999) ("encryption software, in its source code form and as employed by those in
the field of cryptography, must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment pur-
poses").
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been better served had Congress taken more of a wait-and-see
approach in the 1920s, rather than quickly establishing the
Federal Radio Commission to license spectrum. As Thomas
Hazlett has explained, the common law model embodied in the
Oak Leaves Broadcasting case might have provided some in-
sight on how to recognize property rights in spectrum that
could be privatized and auctioned off to the highest bidder well
before we settled on that approach as a matter of national pol-
icy, had we given that model a chance to work.'15
On a final note on this topic, I want to second Larry Les-
sig's advice that citizens and policymakers not make the mis-
take of thinking that doing nothing with respect to the internet
will enable a "natural course" of action.'16 The internet, like
the electromagnetic spectrum, is a medium that exists in large
part because the government-through one means or another-
facilitated the emergence of a common protocol and a ubiqui-
tously accessible network. To keep this network working,
someone must make decisions on how to allocate domain
names, whether to insist on certain types of filtration stan-
dards, and whether any privacy protections should be put in
place. The nature of these questions, and the internet's pres-
ent architecture, may well look vastly different two years from
now, or even two months from now." 7 To be sure, government
need not make those decisions, but, as they do in physical
space, citizens will ultimately turn to their government for ac-
tion if they feel they are being treated unfairly in cyberspace."'
Whatever government does in response to those concerns, we
115. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 149 (1990) (discussing Tribune Co. v.
Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, reprinted in Cong. Rec.-Senate 215-19 (De-
cember 10, 1926)).
116. See LESSIG, supra note 76, at x, 4.
117. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 515 (1999) ("[I]f these technologies of identification
were in general use on the Internet, then the regulability of behavior in cyber-
space would increase. And government can affect whether these technologies are
in general use.").
118. For one argument on why government should play a role in formulating
the values of cyberspace, see Lessig, supra note 109, at 15-16; see also LESSIG,
supra note 76, at 5 ("We build a world where freedom can flourish not by remov-
ing from society and self-conscious control; we build a world where freedom can
flourish by setting it in a place where a particular kind of self-conscious control
survives.").
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can be sure that the consequences will be significant and not
all of them intended. 119
CONCLUSION
No one said telecommunications regulation was for the
faint of heart. In fact, it may well resemble Max Weber's de-
scription of politics in general: "the strong and slow boring of
hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective."12 ° The
challenges ahead in telecommunications policy will require
hard-headed thinking and an honest engagement with the
types of questions discussed above. If the papers here are any
sign of what the academy can bring to this discussion, I hope
that these sorts of debates will continue in the years ahead,
helping to shed light on issues that will need all of the passion
and perspective policymakers can muster.
119. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 111, at 1249-51 (discussing how a num-
ber of potential policies will require filtering and labeling of information, thus in-
terfering with free information flow).
120. MAX WEBER, Politics As a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY, 77, 128 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1948).
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